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Call for Patent Claims 143
This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use 144 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information 145
Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be 146 directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also 147 includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications 148 relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents. 149 150 ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, 151
in written or electronic form, either: 152 153 a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and 154
does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or 155 156 b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to applicants 157 desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance or requirements in 158 this ITL draft publication either: 159 160
i) under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair 161 discrimination; or 162 163
ii) without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are 164 demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. 165 166 Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances 167 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the 168 assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on 169 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of 170 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest. 171 172 The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest 173 regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents. This complex enterprise has led to a new way to plan enterprise network security known as Zero 275
Trust Architecture (ZTA). A ZTA approach is primarily focused on data protection but can be 276 expanded to include all enterprise assets. ZTA assumes the network is hostile and that an 277 enterprise-owned network infrastructure is no different-or no more secure-than any non-278 enterprise owned network. In this new paradigm, an enterprise must continuously analyze and 279 evaluate the risks to their internal assets and business functions and then enact protections to 280 mitigate these risks. In ZTA, these protections usually involve minimizing access to resources to 281 only those who are validated as needing access and continuously authenticating the identity and 282 security posture of each access request. 283
This publication provides a definition of ZTA, its logical components, possible deployment 284 scenarios, and threats. It also presents a general roadmap for organizations wishing to migrate to 285 a ZTA-centered network infrastructure and discusses relevant federal policies that may impact or 286 influence a zero trust architecture. 287 ZTA is not a single network architecture but a set of guiding principles in network infrastructure 288 design and operation that can be used to improve the security posture of any classification or 289 sensitivity level. Transitioning to ZTA is a journey and cannot be accomplished without a 290 wholesale replacement of technology. That said, many organizations already have elements of a 291 ZTA in their enterprise infrastructure today. Organizations should seek to incrementally 292 implement zero trust principles, process changes, and technology solutions that protect its data 293 assets and business functions. Most enterprise infrastructures will operate in a hybrid Zero 294
Trust/Legacy mode during this time while continuing to invest in ongoing IT modernization 295 initiatives and improving organization business processes. 296
Organizations need to implement effective information security and resiliency practices for zero 297 trust to be effective. When complemented with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, 298 identity and access management, continuous monitoring, and general cybersecurity, ZTA can 299 reinforce an organization's security posture using a managed risk approach and protect against 300 common threats. 301
Background

302
The concept of zero trust has been present in cybersecurity since before the actual term "zero 303
trust" was coined. The work of the Jericho Forum publicized the idea of limiting implicit trust 304 based on network location and the limitations of relying on static defenses [JERICHO] . The 305
concepts in de-perimeterization evolved and improved into a larger concept that became known 306 as zero trust. Later, Jon Kindervag coined the term "Zero Trust" 1 while at Forrester 2 (now at 307
Palo Alto Networks). This work included key concepts and a zero trust network architecture 308 model that improved upon the concepts discussed in the Jericho Forum. 309
In many ways, federal agencies have been moving to network security based on zero trust 310 principles for over a decade. Federal agencies have been building capabilities and policies 311 starting with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) followed by the Risk 312
Management Framework (RMF); Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management 313 (FICAM); Trusted Internet Connection (TIC); and Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 314 (CDM) programs. All of these programs aim to restrict data and resource access to authorized 315
parties. When these programs were started, they were limited by the technical capabilities of 316 information systems. Security policies were largely static and were enforced at large "choke 317
points" that an enterprise could control to get the largest effect for the effort. As technology 318 matures, it is becoming possible to continuously analyze and evaluate access requests in a 319 dynamic and granular fashion. 320
1.2
Structure of this Document
321
The rest of the document is broken down as follows: 322
• Section 2: Defines ZTA and lists some network assumptions when designing ZTA 323 enterprise networks. This section also includes a list of the tenets of ZTA design. 324
• Section 3: Documents the logical components, or building blocks, of a ZTA. It is 325 possible that unique implementations compose ZTA components differently yet serve the 326 same logical functionality. 327
• Section 4: Lists some possible use cases where ZTA may make enterprise networks more 328 secure and less prone to successful exploitation. These include enterprises with remote 329 employees, cloud services, guest networks, etc. 330
• Section 5: Discusses the threats to an enterprise using a ZTA strategy. Many of these 331
threats are similar to more traditionally architected networks but may require different 332 mitigation techniques. 333
• Section 6: Discusses how ZTA tenets fit into and/or complement existing guidance for 334 federal agencies. 335
• Section 7: Presents the starting point for transitioning an enterprise (such as a federal 336 agency) to a ZTA. This includes a description of the general steps needed to plan and 337 deploy applications and network infrastructure that are guided by ZTA tenets. 338 339 2
Zero Trust Network Architecture 340 Zero Trust Architecture is an end-to-end approach to network/data security that encompasses 341 identity, credentials, access management, operations, endpoints, hosting environments, and the 342 interconnecting infrastructure. Zero trust is an architectural approach that is focused on data 343
protection. The initial focus should be on restricting resource access to those with a "need to 344 know." Traditionally, agencies (and enterprise networks in general) have focused on perimeter 345 defense, and authorized users are given broad access to resources. As a result, unauthorized 346 lateral movement within a network has been one of the biggest challenges for federal agencies. 347 The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and agency perimeter firewalls provide strong Internet 348 gateways. This helps block attackers from the Internet, but the TICs and perimeter firewalls are 349 less useful for detecting and blocking attacks from inside the network. This definition focuses on the crux of the issue, which is to eliminate unauthorized access to 355 data and services, coupled with making the access control enforcement as granular as possible. 356 That is, authorized and approved subjects (user/machine) can access the data to the exclusion of 357 all other subjects (i.e., attackers). To take this one step further, the word "resource" can be 358 substituted for "data" so that ZTA is about resource access (e.g., printers, compute resources, IoT 359 actuators, etc.) and not just data access. 360
In order to lessen uncertainties (as they cannot be totally eliminated), the focus is on 361 authentication, authorization, and shrinking implied trust zones while minimizing temporal 362 delays in network authentication mechanisms. Access rules are restricted to least privilege and 363 made as granular as possible. 364
In Figure 1 The system must ensure the user is "trustworthy" and the request is valid. The PDP/PEP passes 370
proper judgment to allow the subject to access the resource. This implies that Zero Trust applies 371 for two basic areas: authentication and authorization. Can the system remove sufficient doubt 372 about the user's true identity? Is the user justified in their access request? Is the device used for 373 the request trustworthy? Overall, enterprises need to develop risk-based policies for resource 374 access and set up a system to ensure that these policies are executed correctly. This means that an 375 enterprise should not rely on implied trustworthiness, wherein if the user has met a base 376 authentication level (i.e., logging into a system), all resource requests are assumed to be equally 377 valid. 378
The "Implied Trust Zone" represents an area where all the entities are trusted to at least the level 379 of the last PDP/PEP gateway. For example, consider the passenger screening model in an airport. 380
All passengers pass through the airport security check point (PDP/PEP) to access the boarding 381
gates. The passengers mill about in the terminal area and all the cleared passengers have a 382 common trust level. In this model, the implied trust zone is the boarding area. 383
The PDP/PEP applies a common set of controls such that all traffic beyond the checkpoint has a 384 common level of trust. The PDP/PEP cannot apply policy beyond its location in the flow of 385 traffic. In order to allow the PDP/PEP to be as specific as possible, the Implied Trust Zone has to 386 be as small as possible. 387
Zero Trust Architecture provides technology and capabilities to allow the PDP/PEPs to move 388
closer to the resource. The idea is to authenticate and authorize every single flow in the network 389 from actor (or application) to data. 390
Tenets of Zero Trust Architecture
391
Many definitions and discussions of ZTN/ZTA stress the concept of removing perimeter 392 defenses (e.g., firewalls, etc.) from the equation. However, most continue to define themselves in 393 relation to perimeters in some way (such as micro-segmentation or micro-perimeters). The 394
following is an attempt to define ZTA in terms of basic tenets that should be involved, not what 395 is excluded. 396
A Zero Trust Architecture is designed and deployed adhering to the following basic tenets: 397 1. All data sources and computing services are considered resources. A network may be 398 composed of several different classes of devices. A network may also have small 399 footprint devices that send data to aggregators/storage, systems sending instructions to 400 actuators, etc. Also, an enterprise may decide to classify personally-owned devices as 401 resources if they are allowed to access enterprise-owned resources. 402
2. All communication is secure regardless of network location. Network location does 403 not imply trust. Access requests from systems located on enterprise-owned network 404
infrastructure (e.g., inside a legacy network perimeter) must meet the same security 405 requirements as access requests and communication from any other non-enterprise owned 406 network. In other words, there should not be any trust automatically granted based on the 407 device being on enterprise network infrastructure. All communication should be done in a 408 secure manner (i.e., encrypted and authenticated). 409
3. Access to individual enterprise resources is granted on a per-connection basis. Trust 410 in the requester is evaluated before the access is granted. This could mean only 411 "sometime previously" for this particular transaction and may not occur directly before 412 initiating a connection with a resource. However, authentication to one resource will not 413 automatically grant access to a different resource. and what access to resources those members need. User identity includes the network 418 account used and any associated attributes assigned by the enterprise to that account. 419 Requesting system state includes device characteristics such as software versions 420 installed, network location, previously observed behavior, installed credentials, etc. 421
Behavioral attributes include automated user analytics, device analytics, and measured 422 deviations from observed usage patterns. Policy is the set of attributes an organization 423 assigns to a user, data asset, or application. These attributes are based on the needs of the 424 business process and acceptable level of risk. Resource access policies can vary based 425 upon the sensitivity of the resource/data. Least privilege principles are applied in order to 426 restrict both visibility and accessibility. 427 5. The enterprise ensures all owned and associated systems are in the most secure state 428 possible and monitors systems to ensure that they remain in the most secure state 429
possible. An enterprise implementing a ZTA strategy should establish a Continuing 430
Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program to monitor the state of systems and apply 431 patches/fixes as needed. Systems that are discovered to be subverted, vulnerable, and/or 432 non-enterprise-owned may be treated differently (including denial of all connections to 433 enterprise resources) than systems owned by or associated with the enterprise that are 434 deemed to be in their most secure state. 435 6. User authentication is dynamic and strictly enforced before access is allowed. This is 436 a constant cycle of access, scanning and assessing threats, adapting, and continuously 437
authenticating. An enterprise implementing a ZTA strategy has a user provisioning 438 system in place and uses the system to authorize access to resources. This includes the 439 use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for access to some (or all) enterprise resources. 440
Continuous monitoring and re-authentication occur throughout user interaction, as 441 defined and enforced by policy (e.g., time-based, new resource requested, resource 442 modification, etc.) that strives to achieve a balance of security, availability, usability, and 443 cost-efficiency. 444 445 The above tenets attempt to be as technology-agnostic as possible. For example, "network ID" 446 could include several factors such as username/password, certificates, one-time password, or 447 some other identification. 448
A Zero Trust View of a Network
449
There are some basic assumptions for network connectivity for any organization that utilizes 450 ZTA in network planning and deployment. Some of these assumptions apply to enterprise-owned 451 network infrastructure, and some apply to enterprise-owned resources used on non-enterprise-452 owned network infrastructure (e.g., public WiFi). The network in an enterprise implementing a 453 ZTA strategy should be developed with the ZTA tenets outlined above and with the following 454 assumptions. 455 and/or contracted services may include non-enterprise-owned systems that need network 462 access in order to perform their role. This also includes bring-your-own-device (BYOD) 463
Assumptions for Enterprise-Owned Network
policies that allow enterprise users to use non-enterprise-owned devices to access 464 enterprise resources. 465 3. No device is inherently trusted. Every device must authenticate itself (either to resource 466 or PEP) before connecting to an enterprise-owned resource (see Tenet 6 above). 467
Enterprise-owned devices can have artifacts that enable authentication and provide a 468 higher trust score (see Section 3.2) than the same request coming from non-enterprise-469 owned devices. User credentials are insufficient for device authentication to an enterprise 470 resource. 471 472 Infrastructure   473 1. Not all enterprise resources are on enterprise-owned infrastructure. This includes 474 remote users as well as cloud services. The enterprise must be able to monitor, configure, 475 and patch any system, but any system may rely on the local (i.e., non-enterprise) network 476
Assumptions for Non-Enterprise-Owned Network
for basic connectivity and network services (e.g., DNS, etc. There are numerous logical components that make up a ZTA network deployment in an 486 enterprise. These components may be operated as an on-premises service or through a cloud-487 based service. The conceptual framework model in Figure 2 shows the basic relationship of the 488 components and their interactions. Note that this is an ideal model showing logical components 489
and their interactions. From Figure 1 as well as input from external sources (e.g., IP blacklists, threat intelligence services) as 498 input to a "trust algorithm" to decide to grant or deny access to the resource. The Policy 499
Engine is paired with the Policy Administrator component. The Policy Engine makes 500 (and logs) the decision, and the Policy Administrator executes the decision (approval or 501 denial). 502
• Policy Administrator (PA): This component is responsible for establishing the 503 connection between a client and a resource. It would generate any authentication token or 504 credential used by a client to access an enterprise resource. It is closely tied to the Policy 505
Engine and relies on its decision to ultimately allow or deny the connection. 506
Implementations may treat the Policy Engine and Policy Administrator as a single 507 service; here, it is divided into its two logical components. The PA communicates with 508
the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) when creating the connection. This communication 509
is done via the control plane. 510
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): This system is responsible for enabling, monitoring, 511
and eventually terminating connections between a subject and an enterprise resource. 512
This is a single logical component in ZTA but may be broken up into two different 513 components: the client (e.g., agent on user's laptop) and resource side (e.g., gateway 514 component in front of resource that controls access) or a single portal component that acts 515
as a gatekeeper for connections. 516
In addition to the core components in an enterprise implementing a ZTA strategy, there are 517 several data sources that provide input and policy rules used by the policy engine when making 518 access decisions. These include local data sources as well as external (i.e., non-enterprise 519 controlled or created) data sources. These include: 520
• Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) System(s): This system(s) gathers 521 information about the enterprise system's current state and applies updates to 522 configuration and software components. An enterprise CDM system provides the Policy 523
Engine with the information about the system making an access request, such as whether 524
it is running the appropriate patched OS and applications or whether the system has any 525 known vulnerabilities. 526
• Industry Compliance System: This system ensures that the enterprise remains 527 compliant with any regulatory regime they may fall under (e.g. FISMA, HIPAA, PCI-528 DSS, etc.). This includes all the policy rules an enterprise develops to ensure compliance. 529
• Threat Intelligence Feed(s): This system provides information from outside sources that 530 help the Policy Engine make access decisions. These could be multiple services that take 531
data from multiple external sources and provide information about newly discovered 532 attacks or vulnerabilities. This also includes DNS blacklists, discovered malware, or 533
command and control systems that the Policy Engine will want to deny access to from 534 enterprise systems. 535
• Data Access Policies: This is the set of attributes, rules, and policies about data access 536 created by the enterprise around enterprise resources. This set of rules could be encoded 537 in the Policy Engine or dynamically generated by the PE. These policies are the starting 538 point for granting access to a resource as they provide the basic access privileges for 539 actors and applications in the enterprise. These roles and access rules should be based on 540 user roles and the mission needs of the organization. 541
• Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): This system is responsible for generating 542 and logging certificates issued by the enterprise to resources, actors, and applications. 543
This also includes the global CA ecosystem and the Federal PKI 3 , which may or may not 544 be integrated with the enterprise PKI. 545
• ID Management System: This system is responsible for creating, storing, and managing 546 enterprise user accounts and identity records. This system contains the necessary user 547
information (e.g., name, email address, certificates, etc.) and other enterprise 548 characteristics such as role, access attributes, or assigned systems. This system often 549
utilizes other systems (such as a PKI above) for artifacts associated with user accounts. 550
• Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) System: The enterprise system that 551
aggregates system logs, network traffic, resource entitlements, and other events that 552 provide feedback on the security posture of enterprise information systems. This data is 553 then used to refine policies and warn of possible active attacks against enterprise systems. 554
Deployed Variations of the Abstract Architecture
555
All of these components are logical components. They do not necessarily need to be unique 556 systems. A single system may perform the duties of multiple logical components, and likewise, a 557 logical component may consist of multiple hardware or software elements to perform the tasks. 558
For example, an enterprise PKI may consist of one component responsible for issuing certificates 559 for devices and another used for issuing certificates to end users, but both use intermediate 560 certificates issued from the same enterprise root certificate authority. In many ZTA network 561 offerings currently available on the market, the PE and PA components are combined in a single 562 service. 563
There are several variations on the deployment of selected components of the architecture that 564 are outlined in the sections below. Depending on how an enterprise network is set up, multiple 565
ZTA deployment models may be in use for different business processes in one enterprise. 566
Device Agent/Gateway-Based Deployment
567
In this deployment model, the PEP is divided into two components that reside on the resource or 568
as a component directly in front of a resource. For example, each enterprise-issued system has an 569 installed device agent that coordinates connections, and each resource has a component (i.e., 570 gateway) that is placed directly in front so that the resource only communicates with the 571 gateway, essentially serving as a reverse proxy for the resource. The gateway is responsible for 572
connecting to the Policy Administrator and only allows approved connections configured by the 573
Policy Administrator (see Figure 3 ). 574 
576
In a typical connection scenario, a user with an enterprise-issued laptop wishes to connect to an 577 enterprise resource (e.g., HR application/database). The connection request is taken by the local 578 agent, and a connection request is sent to the Policy Administrator. The Policy Administrator 579 (and Policy Engine) could be an enterprise local system or a cloud-hosted service. The Policy 580
Administrator forwards the request to the Policy Engine for evaluation. If the request is 581 authorized, the Policy Administrator configures a communication channel between the device 582 agent and the relevant resource gateway (via the control plane). This may include IP address/port 583 information, session key, or similar security artifacts. The device agent and gateway then 584 connect, and encrypted application data flows begin. The connection between the device agent 585 and resource gateway is terminated when the workflow is completed or when triggered by the 586
Policy Administrator due to a security event (e.g., session timeout, failure to re-authenticate, 587 etc.). 588
This model is best utilized for enterprises that have a robust device management program in 589 place and discrete resources that can communicate with the gateway. For enterprises that heavily 590 utilize cloud services, this is a client-server implementation of the Cloud Security Alliance 591 (CSA) Software Defined Perimeter (SDP) [CSA-SDP]. This model is also good for enterprises 592 that do not want to have a bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policy in place. Access is only 593 granted via the device agent, which can be placed on enterprise-owned systems. 594
Microperimeter-Based Deployment
595
This deployment model is a variation of the device agent/gateway model above. In this model, 596
the gateway components may not reside on systems or in front of individual resources but 597 instead reside at the boundary of a resource enclave (e.g., on-location data center) as shown in 598 Figure 4 . Usually, these resources serve a single business function or may not be able to 599 communicate directly to a gateway (e.g., legacy database system that does not have an API that 600 cannot be used to communicate with a gateway). This deployment model may also be useful for 601 enterprises that use cloud-based microservices for business processes (e.g., user notification, 602 database lookup, or salary disbursement). In this model, the entire private cloud is located behind 603 a gateway. 604 605
Figure 4: Enclave Gateway Model
It is possible for this model to be a hybrid with the device agent/gateway model. In this model, 607
enterprise systems have a device agent that is used to connect to microperimeter gateways, but 608 these connections are created using the same process as the basic device agent/gateway model. 609
This model is useful for enterprises that have legacy applications or on-premises data centers that 610 cannot have individual gateways in place. The enterprise needs to have a robust device 611 management program in place to install/configure the device agents. The downside is that the 612 gateway protects a collection of resources and not each resource individually. This is a relaxation 613 of the ZTA tenet that each resource should have its own PEP protecting it. This may also allow 614 for clients to see resources for which they do not have privileges to access. 615
Resource Portal-Based Deployment
616
In this deployment model, the PEP is a single component, which acts as a gateway for user 617 requests. The gateway portal can be for an individual resource or a microperimeter for a 618 collection of resources used for a single business function. One example would be a gateway 619
portal into a private cloud or data center containing legacy applications as shown in Figure 5 . 620 621 
622
The main benefit of this model over the others is that there does not need to be a software 623 component installed on all enterprise systems. This model is also more flexible for BYOD 624 policies and inter-organization collaboration projects. Enterprise administrators do not need to 625 ensure that each device has the appropriate device agent before use. However, limited 626 information can be inferred from devices requesting access. It can only scan and analyze systems 627
and devices once they connect to the PEP portal and may not be able to continuously monitor 628 them for malware and appropriate configuration. 629
The main difference with this model is that there is no local agent that handles requests. This 630 model allows for more flexibility in client systems and BYOD policies and may make it easier to 631 grant resource access to non-enterprise collaborators. The disadvantage is that the enterprise may 632 not have full visibility or control over enterprise-owned systems as they can only see/scan them 633 when they connect to a portal. These systems may be invisible to the enterprise between these 634 connection sessions. This model also allows for attackers to discover and attempt to access the 635 portal or attempt a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the portal. 636
System Application Sandboxing
637
Another variation of the agent/gateway deployment model is having trusted applications run 638 compartmentalized on systems. These compartments could be VMs, containers, or some other 639 implementation, but the goal is the same: to protect the application from the host and other 640 applications running on the system. 641 642 643
Figure 6: Application Sandboxes
644
In Figure 6 above, the user system runs trusted applications in a sandbox. The trusted application 645
can communicate with the PEP to request access to resources, but the PEP will refuse 646 connections from other (non-trusted) applications on the system. The PEP could be an enterprise 647 local service or a cloud service in this model. 648
The main advantage of this model variant is that individual applications are segmented away 649 from the rest of the system. If the system cannot be scanned for vulnerabilities, these individual 650 sandboxed applications may be protected from a potential malware infection on the host system. 651
One of the disadvantages to this model is that enterprises must maintain these sandboxed apps 652
for all systems and may not have full visibility into client systems. 653
Trust Algorithm
654
For an enterprise with a ZTA deployment, the Policy Engine can be thought of as the brain and 655 the PE's trust algorithm its primary thought process. The trust algorithm is the process used by 656
the Policy Engine to ultimately grant or deny access to a resource. The Policy Engine takes input 657 from multiple sources: the policy database with information about users, user attributes and 658 roles, historic user behavior patterns, threat intelligence sources, and other metadata sources. The 659 process can be visualized in Figure 7 . • Access request: The actual request from the application. The resource requested is the 666 primary information used, but information about the requester is also used. This can 667 include OS version, application used, and patch level. Depending on the system state, 668 access to assets might be restricted or denied. 669
• User identification, attributes, and privileges: This is the "who" that is requesting 670 access to a resource. This is the set of users (human and processes) of the enterprise and a 671 collection of user attributes developed by the enterprise. These users and attributes form 672 the basis for policies for resource access [SP800-162][NISTIR 7987]. User identities can 673 include a mix of logical identity (e.g., account ID/password), biometric data (e.g., 674
fingerprints, facial recognition, iris recognition, retina, and odor/scent), and behavior 675 characteristics (e.g., typing rhythm, gait, and voice). Attributes of identity that should be 676 factored into deriving trust scores include time and geolocation. A collection of privileges 677
given to multiple users could be thought of as a role, but privileges should be assigned to 678 a user on an individual basis and not simply because they may fit into a particular role. 679
This should be encoded and stored in an ID management system and policy database. 680
• System database and observable status: This is the database containing the known 681 status of each enterprise-owned system (physical and virtual, to some extent). This is 682 compared to the observable status of the system making the request. This can include OS 683 version, application used, location (network location and geolocation), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and patch level. Depending on the system state, access to assets might be 685 restricted or denied. 686
• Resource access requirements: This is the complementary set of policies to the user ID 687 and attributes database. This defines the minimal requirements for access to the resource. 688
Requirements may include authenticator assurance levels, such as multifactor 689 authentication (MFA) and network location (e.g., deny access from overseas IP 690 addresses) or requests for system configuration. These requirements should be developed 691 by both the data custodian (i.e., those responsible for the data) and those responsible for 692 the business processes that utilize the data (i.e., those responsible for the mission). 693
• Threat intelligence: This is an information feed (or feeds) about general threats and 694 active malware operating on the Internet. This can include attack signatures and 695 mitigations. This is the only component that will rarely be under control of the enterprise 696 but most likely a service. 697
The weight of importance for each data source may be a proprietary algorithm or may be 698 configured by the enterprise. These weight values can be used to reflect the importance of the 699 data source to an enterprise. 700
The final determination is then passed to the PA for enforcement. The PA's job is to configure 701 the necessary PEPs to enable the connection. Depending on how the ZTA is deployed, this may 702 involve sending authentication results and connection configuration information to gateways and 703 agents or resource portals. The PA is also responsible for terminating the connection based on 704 policy (e.g., after a timeout, when the workflow has been completed, or due to a security alert). 705
Trust Algorithm Variations
706
There are different ways to implement a ZTA Trust Algorithm (TA). Different implementors 707 may wish to weigh the above factors differently, according to their perceived importance. There 708 are two other major characteristics that can be used to differentiate TAs. The first is how the 709 factors are evaluated, either as binary decisions or weighted parts of a whole "score." The second 710 is how they evaluate requests in relation to other requests by the same user (or application) ID. 711
• Criteria vs. Score-based: A criteria-based TA assumes a set of qualified attributes that 712 must be met before access is granted to a resource. These criteria are configured by the 713 enterprise and should be independently configured for every resource. Access is granted 714
to a resource only if all the criteria are met. A score-based TA computes a "score" based 715 on values for every data source and enterprise-configured weights. If the score is greater 716 than the configured threshold value for the resource, access is granted. Otherwise, the 717 access is denied. 718
• Singular vs. Contextual: A singular TA treats each request individually and does not 719 take the user/application history into consideration when making its evaluation. This can 720 allow for faster evaluations, but there is a risk that an attack can go undetected if it stays 721 within a user's allowed role. A contextual TA takes a user's (or network agent's) recent 722 history into consideration when evaluating access requests. This means the PE must 723 maintain some state information of all users and applications but may be more likely to 724 detect an attacker using subverted credentials to access information in a pattern that is 725 atypical of what the PE sees for the given user/agent. 726
The two factors are not dependent on each other. It is possible to have a TA that assigns trust 727 scores to every user and/or device and still considers every access request independently (i.e., 728 singular). Likewise, a different TA may be score-based but be contextual in that every successful 729 and failed access request could be used to change the ultimate trust score value. 730
Ideally, a ZTA Trust Algorithm should be contextual, but this may not always be possible. This 731
can mitigate threats where an attacker stays close to a "normal" set of access requests for a 732 compromised user account (or insider attack). It is important to balance security, usability, and 733 cost effectiveness when defining and implementing Trust Algorithms. Continually prompting a 734 user for re-authentication against behavior that is consistent with historical trends and norms for 735 their mission function and role within the organization can lead to usability issues. For example, 736
if an employee in the HR department of an agency normally accesses 20-30 employee records in 737 a typical workday, a contextual TA may send an alert if the access requests suddenly exceed 100 738 records in a day as this could be an attacker exfiltrating records using a compromised HR 739 account. This is an example where a contextual TA can detect an attack whereas a singular TA 740 may fail to detect the new behavior. Another example is an accountant who typically accesses 741
the financial system during normal business hours and is now trying to access the system in the 742 middle of the night from an unrecognizable location. A contextual TA may trigger an alert and 743 require the user to satisfy a more stringent score or other criteria as outlined in NIST SP 800-63a 744
[SP800-63A]. 745
Developing a set of criteria or weights/threshold values for each resource requires planning and 746 testing. Enterprise administrators may encounter issues during the initial deployment of ZTA 747
where access requests that should be approved are denied due to misconfiguration. This will 748 result in an initial "tuning" phase of deployment. Criteria or scoring weights may need to be 749 adjusted to ensure that the policies are enforced while still allowing the enterprise's business 750 processes to function. 751
Network Components
752
In a ZTA network, there should be a separation (logical or possibly physical) between 753 communication flows used to control and configure the network and application communication 754 flows used to perform the actual work of the organization. This is often broken down to a control 755 plane for network control communication and a data plane for application communication flows 756 [Gilman] . 757
The control plane is used by the various infrastructure components for maintaining systems; 758 judging, granting, or denying access to resources; and performing any necessary operations to set 759 up connections between resources. The data plane is used for the actual communication between 760
applications. This communication channel may not be possible prior to the connection being 761 established via the control plane. For example, the control plane could be used by the PA and 762 PEP to set up the connection between the user and the enterprise resource. The application 763 workload would then use the data plane connection that was established. 764 the control plane to communicate and manage connections between systems. The PEPs 786 must be able to send and receive messages from both the data and control planes. 787 6. Enterprise systems can reach the PEP component. Enterprise users must be able to 788 access the PEP component on their enterprise ZTA network in order to gain access to 789 resources. This could take the form of a web portal or software agent on the enterprise 790 system that enables the connection. 791
Network Requirements to Support
The PEP is the only component that can access the Policy Administrator and Policy 792
Engine. Each PEP operating on the enterprise network has a connection to the Policy 793
Administrator in order to establish connections from clients. The PA may be 794 discoverable, but only PEPs are allowed to connect. 795 8. Remote enterprise systems should be able to access enterprise resources without 796 needing to traverse through enterprise infrastructure. For example, a remote user 797
should not be required to use a secure link back to the enterprise network (i.e., VPN) in 798 order to access services utilized by the enterprise and hosted by a public cloud provider 799 (e.g., email). 800 9. Enterprise systems may not be able to reach certain PEPs due to observable factors. 801 For example, mobile systems may not be able to reach certain resources unless they are 802 using enterprise network infrastructure. These factors could be based on location 803
(geolocation or network location), device type, etc. 804
Deployment Scenarios/Use Cases 806
Any enterprise network can be designed with zero trust tenets in mind. Most organizations 807 already have some elements of zero trust in their enterprise infrastructure today or are on their 808 way through implementation of information security and resiliency policies and best practices. 809
There are several deployment scenarios and use cases that lend themselves more readily to a zero 810 trust architecture. For instance, ZTA has its roots in organizations that are geographically 811 distributed and/or have a highly mobile workforce. That said, any organization that has a sizable 812 network with multiple resources can benefit from a zero trust architecture. 813
In the use cases below, ZTA is not explicitly indicated, as the enterprise likely has both legacy 814
and (possibly) ZTA infrastructures. As discussed in Section 7.2, there will likely be a period of 815 time when ZTA components and legacy network infrastructure are concurrently in operation in 816 an enterprise. 817
4.1
Enterprise with Satellite Facilities
818
The most common scenario is an enterprise with a single headquarters and one or more 819 geographically dispersed locations that are not joined by an enterprise-owned physical network 820 connection (see Figure 8 ). Employees at the remote location may not have a full enterprise-821 owned local network but still need to access enterprise resources in order to perform their tasks. 822
Likewise, employees may be teleworking or in a remote location using enterprise-owned or 823 personally-owned devices. In such cases, an enterprise may wish to grant access to some 824 resources (e.g., employee calendar, email) but deny access to more sensitive resources (e.g., HR 825 database). 826
In this use case, the PE/PA is best hosted as a cloud service with end systems having a 827 connection agent (see 
4.2
Multi-Cloud Enterprise
833
One increasingly common use case for deploying a ZTA strategy is an enterprise utilizing 834 multiple cloud providers (see Figure 9 ). In this use case, the enterprise has a local network but 835 uses two (or more) cloud service providers to host applications and data. Sometimes, the 836 application is hosted on a separate cloud service than the data source. For performance and ease 837 of management, the application hosted in Cloud Provider A should be able to connect directly to 838 the data source hosted in Cloud Provider B rather than force the application to tunnel back 839 through the enterprise network. 840 As enterprises move to more 844 cloud-hosted applications and services, it becomes apparent that relying on the enterprise 845 perimeter for security becomes a liability. As discussed in Section 2.2, ZTA takes the view that 846 there should be no difference between enterprise-owned and operated network infrastructure and 847 infrastructure owned by any other service provider. The zero trust approach to multi-cloud use is 848
to place PEPs at the access points of each application and data sources. The PE and PA may be a 849 service located in either cloud or even on a third cloud provider. The client (via a portal or local 850 installed agent) then accesses the PEPs directly. That way, the enterprise can still manage access 851 to resources even when hosted outside of the enterprise. 852
Enterprise with Contracted Services and/or Non-Employee Access
853
Another common scenario is an enterprise that includes on-site visitors and/or contracted service 854 providers that require limited access to enterprise resources to do their work (see Figure 10 ). For 855 example, an enterprise has its own internal applications, databases, and employee work systems. 856
These include services contracted out to providers who may occasionally be on-site to provide 857 maintenance tasks (e.g., a smart HVAC system and lighting system that is owned and managed 858 by external providers). These visitors and service providers will need network connectivity to 859 perform their tasks. A ZTA network could facilitate this by allowing these devices (and any 860 visiting service technician) access to the Internet while obscuring enterprise resources. 861 862 Figure 10 : Enterprise with Non-Employee Access
863
In this example the organization also has a conference center where visitors interact with 864 employees. Again, with a ZTA strategy of SDPs, employee devices and users are differentiated 865 and may be able to access appropriate enterprise resources. Visitors to the campus can have 866
Internet access but cannot access enterprise resources. They cannot even conduct network scans 867
to look for enterprise services that may be visible (i.e., prevent active network reconnaissance). 868
In this use case, the PE and PA could be hosted as a cloud service or on the LAN (assuming little 869 or no use of cloud-hosted services). The enterprise systems could have an installed agent or 870 access resources via a portal. The PA ensures all non-enterprise systems (those that do not have 871 installed agents or cannot connect to a portal) cannot access local resources but may access the 872
Internet. 873
Collaboration Across Enterprise Boundaries
874
A fourth use case is cross-enterprise collaboration. For example, there is a project involving 875 employees from Enterprise A and Enterprise B (see Figure 11 ). The two enterprises may be 876 separate federal agencies (G2G) or even a federal agency and a private enterprise (G2B). 877
Enterprise A operates the database used for the project but must allow access to the data for 878 certain members of Enterprise B. Enterprise A can set up specialized accounts for the employees 879
of Enterprise B to access the required data and deny access to all other resources. 880 
882
This scenario can be similar to use case 1 above as employees of both enterprises may not be 883
located on their organization's network infrastructure, and the resource they need to access may 884 be within one enterprise network or hosted in the cloud. Internet users. It is also possible that an attacker could intercept and block traffic to a PEP or PA 916 from a portion (or all) of the user accounts within an enterprise (e.g., a branch office or even a 917 single remote employee). In such cases, only a portion of enterprise users are affected. This is 918 also possible in traditional VPN-based access, as well, and is not unique to ZTA. 919
There is also the possibility of the hosting provider accidently taking the Policy Administrator 920 offline. Similar to the Amazon S3 outage in February 2017 4 that prevented access to customers, 921 an operational error could prevent an entire enterprise from functioning if the policy enforcement 922 component becomes inaccessible from the network. 923
There is also the risk that enterprise resources may not be reachable from the PA, so even if 924 access is granted to a user, the PA cannot configure the access connection from the network. This 925 is similar to any other network disruption in that some or all enterprise users cannot access a 926 particular resource due to that resource not being available for some reason. 927
5.3
Insider Threat
928
Properly implemented ZTA strategies, information security and resiliency policies, and best 929 practices reduce the risk of an insider attack. ZTA does prevent a compromised account or 930 system from accessing resources outside of its normal purview or normal access patterns. 931
Implementation of MFA for network access may also reduce the risk of access from a 932 compromised account. However, just like traditional enterprises, an attacker with valid 933 credentials (or a malicious insider) may still be able to access resources for which the account 934 has been granted access. For example, an attacker (or compromised employee) who has the 935 credentials and enterprise-owned system of a valid human resources employee may still be able 936
to access an employee database. 937 ZTA increases resistance to this attack and prevents any compromised accounts or systems from 938 moving laterally throughout the network. In addition, a contextual Trust Algorithm (see Section 939
3.2.1) is more likely to detect and respond quickly to this attack than in a legacy network. The 940
contextual TA can detect access patterns that are out of normal behavior and deny the 941 compromised account (or insider threat) access to sensitive resources. 942
5.4
Visibility on the Network
943
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, all traffic is inspected and logged on the network and analyzed to 944 identify and react to potential attacks against the enterprise. However, as also mentioned, some 945 (likely the majority) of the traffic on the enterprise network may be opaque to network analysis 946 tools. This traffic may be from non-enterprise-owned systems (e.g., contracted services that use 947 the enterprise infrastructure to access the Internet) or applications that are resistant to passive 948 monitoring. The enterprise cannot perform DPI or examine the encrypted traffic and must use 949 other methods to assess for a possible attacker on the network. 950
That does not mean that the enterprise is unable to analyze encrypted traffic that it sees on the 951 network. The enterprise can collect metadata about the encrypted traffic and use that to detect 952 possible malware communicating on the network or an active attacker. Machine learning 953
techniques [Anderson] can be used to analyze traffic that cannot be decrypted and examined. 954
Employing this type of machine learning would allow the enterprise to categorize traffic as valid 955 or possibly malicious and subject to remediation. In a ZTA deployment, only the traffic from 956 non-enterprise-owned systems would need to be examined as all enterprise traffic is subject to 957 analysis by the Policy Administrator (via the PEPs). 958
Storage of Network Information
959
A related threat to enterprise analysis of network traffic is the analysis component itself. If 960 network traffic and metadata are being stored for further analysis, that data becomes a target for 961 attackers. Just like network diagrams, configuration files, and other assorted network architecture 962 documents, these resources should be protected. If an attacker can successfully gain access to 963 stored traffic information, they may be able to gain insight into the network architecture and 964 identify assets for further reconnaissance and attack. 965
Another source of reconnaissance information for an attacker on a ZT network is the 966 management tool used to encode access policies. Like stored traffic, this component contains 967 access policies to resources and can give an attacker information on which accounts are most 968 valuable to compromise (e.g., the ones that have access to the desired data resources). 969 Like all valuable enterprise data, adequate protections should be in place to prevent unauthorized 970 access and access attempts. As these resources are vital to security, they should have the most 971 restrictive access policies and only be accessible from designated (or dedicated) administrator 972 accounts. 973
5.6
Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats 974 ZTA relies on several different data sources in order to make access decisions, including 975 information about the requesting user, system used, enterprise and external intelligence, threat 976 analysis, etc. Often, the systems used to store and process this information do not have a 977 common, open standard on how to interact and exchange information. This can lead to instances 978
where an enterprise is locked into a subset of providers due to interoperability issues. If one 979 provider has a security issue or disruption, an enterprise may not be able to migrate to a new 980 provider without extreme cost (e.g., replacing several systems) or going through a long transition 981
program (e.g., translating policy rules from one proprietary format to another). Like DoS attacks, 982 this risk is not unique to ZTA, but since ZTA is heavily dependent on the dynamic access of 983 information (both enterprise and service providers), disruption can affect the core business 984
functions of an enterprise. To mitigate associated risks, enterprises should evaluate service 985 providers on a holistic basis by taking into consideration factors such as vendor security controls, 986 enterprise switching costs, and supply chain risk management. 987
5.7
Use of Non-Person Entities (NPE) in ZTA administration.
988
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other software-based agents are being deployed to manage 989 security issues on enterprise networks. These components need to interact with the management 990 components of ZTA (e.g., Policy Engine, Policy Administrator, etc.), sometimes in lieu of a 991 human administrator. How these components authenticate themselves in an enterprise 992 implementing a ZTA strategy is an open issue. It is assumed most automated technology systems 993 will use some means to authenticate when using an API to resource components. 994
The associated risk is that an attacker will be able to induce or coerce an NPE agent to perform 995 some task that the attacker does not have privilege to perform. The software agent may have a 996 lower bar for authentication (e.g., API key vs. MFA) to perform administration or security-997 related tasks compared to a human user. If an attacker can interact with the agent, they could 998 theoretically trick the agent into allowing the attacker greater access or to perform some task on 999 behalf of the attacker. There is also a potential risk that an attacker can gain access to a software 1000 agent's credentials and impersonate the agent when performing tasks. 1001
Before undertaking an effort to bring ZTA to an enterprise, there should be a survey of assets and 1170 users. This is the foundation state that must be reached before a ZTA deployment is possible. 1171
These surveys can be conducted in parallel, but both are tied to an examination of the business 1172 processes of the organization. These steps can be mapped to the steps in the Risk Management 1173
Framework (RMF) [SP800-37] as any move to ZTA can be seen as a process to reduce risk to an 1174 agency's business functions. The pathway to ZTA can be visualized in Figure After the initial inventory is created, there is a regular cycle of maintenance and updating. This 1178 updating may change business processes or not have any impact, but the evaluation of business 1179 processes should be conducted. For example, a change in digital certificate providers may not 1180 appear to have a significant impact but may involve certificate root store management, 1181
Certificate Transparency log monitoring, and other factors that are not apparent at first. 1182
Identify Actors on the Enterprise
1183
In order for a ZTA network to operate, the PE must have knowledge of enterprise subjects. 1184
"Subjects" encompasses both human and possible non-person entities (NPEs), such as service 1185 accounts that interact with resources. 1186
Users with special privileges, such as developers or system administrators, need additional 1187 consideration when being assigned attributes or roles. In a traditional security architecture, these 1188 accounts may have blanket permission to access all enterprise resources. ZTA should allow for 1189 developers and administrators to have sufficient flexibility to satisfy their business requirements 1190
